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Motor Vehicle: Proof of Insurance: Municipal Courts:
Jurisdiction
CODE SECTIONS:
BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
SUMMARY:

O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-12 (amended), 33-34-13
(repealed) and 36-32-7 (new)
HB 240
589
The Act amends the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act by deleting
the prior language of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12.
In order to meet a successful constitutional
challenge to prior law, O.C.G.A. § 36-32-7
confers jurisdiction on the recorder's,
mayor's or police courts of a municipality
for cases involving operations of a motor
vehicle without a license.

History

The Attorney General issued an unofficial opinion in 1980 to the Recorder's Court of Camilla that it did not have jurisdiction to try cases
alleging a violation of the Code section which requires a person to carry
liability insurance on his automobile. 1 O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12 provides that a
person "who knowingly operates or knowingly authorizes another to operate a motor vehicle without effective insurance" or approved self-insurance is guilty of a misdemeanor. Prior to revision O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12(b)
provided that any person charged with violation of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12(a)
could be "tried in any recorder's, mayor's, or police court of any municipality if the offense occurred within the corporate limits of that
municipality."
Although the recorder's court seemed to have authority to handle these
cases, the Attorney General based his conclusion that the court lacked
jurisdiction on the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Millwood. 2 The challenged statute provided: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law to the contrary, any person who is charged with the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana may be tried in any recorder's,
mayor's or police courts of any municipality if the offense occurred within
1. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-4.
2. Id. See also 242 Ga. 244, 248 S.E.2d 643 (1978).
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the corporate limits of such municipality."3 The court found this statute
unconstitutional because it attempted to give the municipal courts jurisdiction to try offenses against the State. The Georgia Supreme Court explained, "[t]his the General Assembly cannot do. 'That the only courts
with authority or jurisdiction under our Constituion to try . . . persons
charged with the violation of State laws, are State courts . . . .'''" Since
the language designating jurisdiction to recorder's, mayor's or police
courts is virtually identical to the challenged statute in Millwood, the Attorney General held that the former Code section would also be
unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia agreed with the Attorney General in
Parker v. State,r. which held O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12 unconstitutional. HB
240 was introduced to amend that part of the statute held unconstitutional in the Parker decision.
HB 240
O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12 now states only that a person "who knowingly operates or knowingly authorizes another to operate a motor vehicle without
effective insurance ... or without an approved plan of self-insurance ...
is guilty of a misdemeanor." O.C.G.A. § 33-34-13, which allowed
municpalities to adopt the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12 by reference
in an ordinance, is repealed.
O.C.G.A. § 36-32-7 was enacted in its place to specifically grant recorder's, mayor's or police courts of each municipality jurisdiction over
cases arising under O.C.G.A. § 33-34-12. The language of this section is
virtually identical to that of O.C.G.A. § 36-32-6 which was passed in response to the Millwood decision.
O.C.G.A. §§ 36-32-7 (c) and (d) are identical to the provisions of the
superseded O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-12 (c) and (d). The defendant may request
a transfer of his case to a court having general misdemeanor jurisdiction.
The municipality does not have any right to impose a penalty in excess of
the limits set forth in the municipal charter.

3. State v. Millwood, 242 Ga. 244, 245, 248 S.E.2d 643, 644 (1978).
4. I d. at 246, 248 S.E.2d at 644.
5. 170 Ga. App. 333, 317 S.E.2d 209 (1984).
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